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SUMMARY
The following summary brings together the principle conclusions of the European Commission’s
Technical Background Document to this Green Paper. This document is available in its entirety from
the Commission’s services.
The purpose of an EU energy supply security policy is to secure, for the EU, the immediate
and longer term availability of a diverse range of energy products at a price which is
affordable to all consumers (domestic and industrial) while respecting environmental
requirements.
The current debate on energy supply security is conditioned by the following developments
analysed below: a) energy demand is rising, both across the EU and candidate countries; b)
demand for conventional energy sources (oil, natural gas, nuclear) is rising, c) demand for
imported energy sources, such as oil and natural gas, is also rising and d) at least in the short
term, without targeted measures, cleaner, more efficient and renewable energy technologies
are unlikely to greatly influence these trends. The first challenge for energy supply policy is
not to deny or over-dramatise this situation, but to manage it and prevent it developing into a
crisis. The second challenge is to balance the need for energy supply policy to cover rising
energy needs with environmental, political, social, technical and economic objectives. The
third challenge is to develop instruments, such as new and renewable energy technologies,
diversification measures and energy efficient practices, which will reduce dependence on
imported fuels, cut energy demand, reduce the connection between economic growth and
energy consumption and thus improve energy security in the long term.
European energy supply faces different forms of risk – physical, economic and
environmental. Thus, there may be a short term physical disruption or a longer term,p e r h a p s
permanent, interruption to supplies of one or more energy sources, or of one or more fuels
from a single geographical area. Economically, Europe is susceptible to changes in energy
prices – such as the recent rises in the oil price. Finally, environmental pressures are
beginning to bear on energy production and use and, ultimately, on supply decisions.
Context
The context for European energy supply policies has changed over the last 30 years as a result
of political, environmental, economic and energy market developments, such as enlargement,
climate change and liberalisation of energy markets. Policies for a secure energy supply must
respect this new framework. Recent developments in energy markets and energy related3
policies (environment, economy etc) create new tensions and constraints for governments and
administrations. On the one hand, they provide additional targets, as in the case of climate
change and the Kyoto Protocol (see below), but on the other, they remove traditional
regulatory instruments, such as the direct management of utilities by government, which is no
longer applicable in the internal energy market.
These changes mean that it is necessary to look at the whole spectrum of energy supply and
demand. This is the purpose of the current document. In general, the short (5 -10years) and
medium (10 – 20 years) term. A secure energy supply depends not only on the security of a
single energy source, but on the balance of energy markets and the possibility of replacing
one source with another source or with other energy policy instrument (e.g. energy savings).
Available options need to take into account not only energy supply objectives, but also the
wider context outlined below.
At first sight, the aims of energy supply security, competitiveness, environment protection
and liberalisation are not always fully compatible. Enlargement of the EU is a further
challenge. The task for policy makers will be to reconcile these wider objectives with the aim
of assuring secure energy supplies and to develop policies, incentives and instruments, for
example energy efficiency, demand side management, diversification of fuel sources and new
technology, which can serve shared goals.
Primary energy sources – oil
In terms of risk to security supply, oil remains the most important sources of energy. EU
dependence on imported oil is starting to grow despite recent falls. The cost of producing oil
in the Middle East is low and supplies in this area are relatively abundant. However,
uncertainty surrounds future investment levels and physical availability of Middle East
reserves. North Sea oil is expensive to exploit and reserves are limited – at best an estimated
25 years’ supply at current production levels. In the past, reductions in energy intensity and
the replacement of oil in heat and power applications transformed the market for oil.
Nonetheless, demand continues to rise. Unless a breakthrough is reached which removes the
almost complete dependence of the expanding transport sector on oil, Europe’s reliance on
Middle East – and OPEC - oil is likely to be virtually complete in the long term, providing
that supplies are technically and geopolitically available. Decisive elements for future oil
requirements are the dependence of the growing transportation sector on oil, the risk of price
fluctuations, and the development of alternative transport fuels.
Natural gas
Europe’s increasing demand for imported natural gas will confirm the need for strong
political and physical links to North Africa and Russia, and increase the attraction of suitable
pipeline links to the Middle East and Central Asia. Enlargement is likely to confirm market
trends for gas, while increasing the EU’s dependence on Russia’s vast reserves. As in other
energy sectors, diversification of supply sources has to be a political priority.
The short-term supply situation for gas is relatively comfortable in terms of reasonable
reserves within an economic distance. In the medium term, it remains to be seen whether gas
is able to defend or even increase its market share if, as seems inevitable, supply costs rise
due to more challenging exploitation conditions and longer transportation distances.
Likewise, in the event that Russia and the former Soviet republics are called upon to supply
the growing markets of East Asia, EU countries could face significant competition and4
increased prices. A set of measures aimed at promoting technological developments, supply
diversification and gas-to-gas competition, integration of markets in a wider Europe as well as
reinforced relations with external supply and transit countries could enhance supply security.
Solid Fuels
From an economic and energy supply viewpoint, coal is attractive. There are extensive
world-wide reserves, including in Europe, and competitive markets keep prices low and
stable. However, coal has been phased out from homes (in earlier “clean air” legislation) and,
more recently, electricity generation, where gas is the preferred choice. Restructuring of the
steel industry has also removed an important customer.
In the long term, coal is likely to remain of interest as new technologies come on stream
which reduce extraction costs, reduce emissions and dramatically increase its efficiency.
After the expiry of the ECSC Treaty in 2002, mechanisms will remain to monitor prices and
promote clean technologies. Thus, it is likely that coal will continue to be used for electricity
generation in the long term, to the benefit of energy diversity and security of supply.
Uranium (Nuclear energy)
Nuclear energy in the EU accounts for approximately 23% of installed electricity generation
capacity but for 35% of electricity production. Nuclear electricity in Europe depends, with
today's technology, on an imported raw material, uranium. The Euratom Treaty, which has
security of nuclear fuel supplies as one of its objectives, provides for a specific policy
instrument for nuclear fuel supplies via the Euratom Supply Agency. Sources of uranium are
more diversified, geographically and physically, than oil and gas. The further steps of the
nuclear cycle are largely domestic and, following recycling, the imported resource becomes a
domestic resource.
Enlargement of the EU is likely to confirm this situation, because, in general, many of the
applicant countries are in a similar situation to nuclear producers within the EU.
Nuclear energy has the attraction that it produces very few emissions of greenhouse gases.
Maintaining nuclear energy’s current share in electricity generation would keep CO2
emissions in this sector to roughly their 1990 level but would require the construction by 2025
of 100 GWe (some 70 reactors) of nuclear capacity to replace reactors reaching their end of
life and to meet increased demand. Keeping existing nuclear plants open for their normal
lifetime of 40 years without building new ones would entail exceeding the 1990 emissions
level by 4% (Source: Dilemma study). If existing nuclear plants were phased out and replaced
with other conventional generating plant, it would become impossible to achieve Kyoto
objectives.
Technically, nuclear could provide a non fossil-fuel burning source of electricity that would
be capable of filling a substantial part of the gap in electricity supply that would be created if
fossil fuel electricity generation were to be drastically reduced as a response to Kyoto.
However, the construction time for a nuclear power plant is significantly longer than for fossil
fuel plants and newly liberalised electricity markets coupled with public and political
opposition to nuclear power (largely related to health and safety factors) are restricting
factors. Lifetime extension of existing plants is a step which could be considered. Given the
timetable for Kyoto commitments, such issues need to be addressed promptly.5
Some Member States (Italy, Sweden, Germany, and Belgium) have decided to phase out
nuclear. In others (France, UK, Finland), nuclear is due to remain a key energy for the
foreseeable future. Looking beyond 2010, the long lead-in time for new nuclear energy
technology means that it is essential to maintain long-term research, partly to find a solution
to the problem of waste, and partly to hand down nuclear expertise to future generations.
Renewable energy sources
Renewable energy sources (RES) are attractive to energy supply for environmental and
geopolitical reasons. Although, in general, the fuel source is cheap or free, the technology has
generally not reached a sufficiently mature stage in order to RES to be economically
attractive. Theoretically, renewable energy has the potential to provide a safe, clean and
affordable energy supply using indigenous sources, without threat of external disruption or
exhaustion of reserves. The Commission has set a target to double the share of renewables
from 6% (mostly large hydro) to 12% of total primary energy production in 2010. However,
in order to reach this target, specific and targeted action will be necessary. As well as
technical barriers, a major obstacle is the high cost of RES technologies compared to the cost
of fossil fuels based technologies. This suggests the need for appropriate financial incentives
to promote renewables. Another obstacle is the exclusion of external costs from the price of
fossil fuels, coupled with an inheritance of subsidies on the part of conventional energies
(including nuclear). This implies a distorted market to the detriment of RES. In those sectors
where technology is more advanced, e.g. wind, costs have fallen dramatically over the
previous decade and continue to fall.
With appropriate investment in the research, development, demonstration and promotion of
renewable technologies, for short, medium and long term commercialisation, renewable
energy has the potential to help to resolve, in an environmentally and economically acceptable
way, many issues facing Europe’s long term energy supply. In particular, full development of
renewable energy sources could play a large part in reducing greenhouse gas emissions from
electricity production. However, this would require the early introduction of targeted
measures, economic incentives and vigorous marketing.
Supply disruption
There are three sources of threats to secure energy supply – economic, physical and
environmental, as described above. Disruptions to energy supply, whether actual or
threatened, can have dramatic effects on society and the economy. Thus, the disruptions to oil
supply in the 1970’s, which were both economic and physical, led to international action to
improve supply security, through the (newly created) IEA and the EU. More recently, the
principles of subsidiarity and liberalisation have underlined the responsibilities of Member
States and utilities for governing their own stocks, reserve planning and crisis mechanisms in
the event of a disruption to supplies. New crisis management systems may be developed as a
result of liberalisation, as the roles of companies and regulators become more clearly defined.
Oil is the focus of recent legislation which improved the quality of the EU’s strategic stocks
of 90 days of consumption. Efforts are currently underway to improve the EU’s crisis
management system. For gas, a committee has recently been established at EU level to
monitor short and long term security of supply developments. For uranium and coal stocks,
reporting mechanisms exist. In general, the impact of the single market and competition has
been to put pressure on utilities to reduce their stockpiles.
Demand for Energy6
Risks to energy supply can be quickly and cheaply addressed by reductions in energy
demand. Managing energy demand is an important instrument in reducing consumption,
preserving finite reserves, mitigating supply difficulties and facilitating sustainable growth.
Energy intensity has been falling and is expected to decrease further, but electricity intensity
will increase as the EU economy moves to more services and high added value activities. EU
energy efficiency has gained 7% since 1990, but only 3% since 1993, although economic
growth has resumed. Improvements in energy efficiency have failed to keep up with growing
demand, such that consumption has continued to rise. Rising consumption, encouraged by
rising purchasing power, increases pressure on energy supplies. In general, reducing demand
is not a priority for privatised utilities. The risk is that, without new incentives and promotion
of energy efficient products, consumer interest in energy efficiency will decline and the
demand for new, more efficient technologies will decline.
Unless energy efficiency improvements keep pace with increased demand, increased demand
will lead to higher consumption and greater strain on energy supplies. The recent trend has
been that rises in consumption have outstripped investments in energy efficiency. For
example, buildings are gradually becoming better insulated, but demand for other appliances
and services, requiring increased energy use, often offset efficiency gains. Likewise, road
vehicles have improved their efficiency, but cars have become bigger, heavier and with more
energy-consuming devices. Despite significant increases in petrol prices recently, the number
of cars and passenger kilometres is expected to rise. The challenge in this area is to reverse
the trend of rises in consumption outstripping gains in energy efficiency.
The enormous potential for energy savings in the buildings and transport sectors indicates the
progress which could be made in reducing consumption and improving supply prospects if
these sectors were to be targeted. However this would require a combination of factors, such
as energy prices which reflected wider costs to society, regulations to eliminate inefficient
products or practices and consumer education. Nevertheless, the additional benefits of such
action, for example in reducing emissions, cutting energy bills and creating jobs, argue for
urgent action.
Fuel Balance
On the positive side, it is unlikely that the EU’s global energy market will be so dependent on
a single sector as it was in the 1970’s, when oil accounted for over 60% of primary energy
supply. This figure is now down to 44%. However, it remains the case that the transport
sector’s almost complete dependence on oil, coupled with its stubbornly rising demand for oil
and, consequently, dollars, is an Achilles’ heel for Europe’s economy. A further
improvement in energy supply prospects is the creation in recent years of new European
networks and decentralised generation. Further, the world energy market is now in many
ways globally organised and interdependent, the result of which is that market changes affect
economies similarly across the globe. Nevertheless, the EU’s control or influence over its
energy supply could still be hampered, particularly in a risk situation, as a result of its
growing dependence on imports from areas outside its traditional economic sphere. In the
short and medium term, this appears to be a trend which affects all conventional energy
sectors. It is therefore imperative that solutions should be found which increase diversity of
fuel supply, give emphasis to reliable and stable external supplies and improve the viability of
indigenous resources, while in parallel reducing the overall need for energy.
Energy technology7
Energy technology will be critical in meeting the needs of current and future generations and
de-linking economic growth from growing energy demand and environmental degradation,
both in the present EU and in an enlarged Europe. In the energy field, technological change
does not come cheap: research is expensive and requires a long development and lead-in
period and the pay back is often uncertain. Successful marketing and consumer education are
also key factors in translating technology know-how into viable products.
Governments have for many years recognised the need for intervention in the energy sector to
provide the right incentives and price signals to firms and influence consumers’ awareness
and behaviour. Thus, public funding, including from the European Community, often has a
pivotal role in financing basic research, developing innovative technologies and promoting
the substantial stock of energy-efficient technologies that are close to being competitive.
There is also growing interest in seeking ways of increasing the impact and appeal of new
technologies by combining them in large-scale collaborative projects which cut across
conventional sectors.
Energy technology is a useful instrument of energy supply security and can complement
objectives in other policy areas, in particular the environment and economics. It offers the
means to improve energy efficiency, reduce energy intensity and vastly increase the share of
clean, durable and renewable energy use. It also has potential to influence global patterns of
energy use and production, as advanced European technologies can provide developing
countries with more sustainable and less damaging means towards economic growth.
Transport of fuel into the EU (Transit)
The growing demand for external energy supplies will place additional pressure on existing
supply routes and necessitate the development of new routes. This has implications for the
availability and price of supplies. Secure energy supplies depend not only on the availability
of reserves, but also on such factors as the capacity of countries to provide adequate
quantities, the willingness of third countries to permit transit, the technical and financial
resources to create and maintain transit routes and an international framework which creates
stable trading conditions. The need to transport energy into Europe gives added emphasis to
international co-operation, both between the EU and its suppliers and among suppliers and
their neighbours, foreign policy, finance, trade agreements and technical collaboration. In this
context, the Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Charter process are important tools in
creating a stable framework for energy supply and energy transit for the EU.
xxxxxxxx
One of the key aims of EU energy policy is a diverse, secure, environmentally friendly and
cost effective EU energy supply. This requires an appropriate political, socio-economic,
business and technology climate, both within the EU and world-wide. Against this
background, the Technical Background Document presents those factors related to energy
supply and other relevant matters which have influenced the Commission’s preparation of its
Green Paper on Energy Supply Security.8
ANNEX 2
NOTE ON THE IMPACT OF FUEL TAXATION ON TECHNOLOGY CHOICE
A Study Commissioned Within Framework Contract for Long Range Energy Modelling
(ENER/4.1040/001)
By Prof. P. Capros, N. Kouvaritakis, Dr. L. Mantzos, V. Panos and E. L. Vouyoukas
Athens, November 2000
1. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this part of the study is to investigate the possible impact of fiscal intervention in the
form of taxation or subsidies on energy consumer choices in EU Member States. In deciding on a type
of equipment to invest, energy consumers start with a need for useful energy and consider alternative
options taking into account their complete system costs including investment costs and fixed and
variable operating and maintenance costs. Usually fuel costs form a large part of variable operating
costs and taxation can substantially affect them. Clearly taxes and subsidies have often been applied
precisely in order to influence choices. However it is also the case that in some instances the aims of
the discrimination may refer to past policy considerations, the taxes and subsidies having survived
through institutional inertia and as a revenue collection expedient without necessarily reflecting
present policy concerns.
The analysis presented here utilises the latest data available on fuel taxation in EU Member States (as
published by the European Commission in March 2000) and provisional data for fuel prices in 2000.
Data on subsidies on coal are taken from the PRIMES model database (as they were determined after
discussions with experts from the different Member States in the context of the Shared Analysis
project).
The PRIMES model database was also the source for the technico-economic data on the different
technologies used by energy consumers in computing the average production cost for the different
energy uses.
Alternative fuels and technologies are examined in the following sectors:
1. Power generation
2. Steam generation by industrial boilers and CHP plants
3. S p a c eh e a t i n gi nh o u s e h o l d s
4. Private cars
The methodology adopted for carrying out the comparison was to assume for each sector that a
“typical” energy consumer requiring new energy consuming equipment either to replace old
equipment or in the form of new energy needs was faced with “average” conditions concerning the
main parameters for the choice. It is important to note that the calculations do not refer to the
economics of using existing equipment which in most cases could be cost effective irrespective of
whether the consumer would have chosen to replace it by the same type of equipment or not.9
Depending on the size of the equipment, economies of scale in terms of investment costs and fixed
and variable operating and maintenance costs may be experienced differentially for different
equipment types. The approach adopted obviously does not take into account such nuances.
Similarly bulk fuel purchases and conditions of delivery (for example interruptibility) may result in
considerably lower unit fuel costs and conversely small deliveries may incur fixed surcharges. Such
price modulation is normal, being based on delivery cost considerations and differs from fuel to fuel. It
is not very marked for oil products which by their nature are easy to store, transport and handle but can
be very pronounced for electricity, natural gas and coal. The latter’s price is also subject to very wide
geographical variations, the proximity of suitable ports and other necessary transportation and
handling infrastructure playing a decisive role in shaping total delivery costs which can in some
instances be very substantial. Here again the condensation implied by “average” conditions leaves
outside such considerations.
The base year for the analysis is 2000 when in many ways conditions in the energy markets have been
very different from those that prevailed during the last decade (more precisely since 1991). Since early
summer there has been a strong rally of international crude oil prices accompanied and often led by
even stronger movements in spot prices of petroleum products and notably the key middle distillates.
Natural gas import prices which are still to a considerable extent linked by pricing formulae to spot
prices of petroleum products have been rising with the appropriate time lags but the increases to gas
prices to the final consumers are still relatively modest. Coal prices on the other hand do not seem to
have been affected. Since average yearly prices have been used for the analysis the picture that
emerges from the above developments is of clear shifts in the competitiveness of different fuels in a
rather transitional environment. Furthermore although high crude oil prices of around € 36 were
assumed to the end of the year it would be very risky to conclude that relative prices and their
competitive implications would remain as assumed here even in the next few years given the volatility
of markets recently.
The above qualifications should serve as a note of caution against an over-interpretation of the results
of the present analysis especially regarding absolute levels of costs. In general a relatively small
difference in competitiveness should be taken as an indication of a high likelihood that under slightly
different conditions (which are anyway uncertain for the reasons stated above) rankings could be
reversed.
2. POWER GENERATION
For the purposes of the analysis concerning power generation eight typical technologies were selected:
· A Pressurised Fluidised Bed Combustion plant (PFBC) representing a clean coal technology
which is currently widely available
· A monovalent lignite (brown coal) power plant fitted with de-sulphurisation units, which still
represents the dominant choice for generating electricity from lignite. For Finland, Ireland and Sweden
under this heading are included the peat fired plants
· A monovalent low sulphur heavy fuel oil plant
· A Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (GTCC) plant which due to very important capital cost
reductions and spectacular increases in overall efficiency has become the prime choice for power
production over a wide range of load requirements
· A monovalent thermal plant using biomass or waste as a fuel where the type and cost of the
biomass varies from country to country depending on conditions arising from industrial structure
(existence of industries producing usable waste), sufficient agricultural waste in adequate density per
square kilometre, the possibility of using plantations etc.
· Large on-shore wind turbines on very windy sites and hence with levels of availability that are
somewhat above the average recorded in the statistics for the different countries10
· Solar photovoltaic cells which naturally represent small scale applications with availability
differentiated according to three insulation zones (high, medium and low) corresponding
approximately to the Mediterranean, mid-latitude and Northern European countries
· A large (over one GigaWatt) Pressurised Water Reactor nuclear power plant (PWR)
Production costs were computed for three different levels of power plant utilisation (7000 hours, 5000
hours and 2500 hours) corresponding indicatively to the utilisation rates of very heavy electricity
intensive industrial plant, small scale industrial uses or energy intensive services and average
household equipment utilisation.
Table 1 illustrates the production cost of the alternative power generation technologies operating at
7000 hours (figures in bold indicate the “least” cost solution). At this level of utilisation, Denmark
apart, the most economic options appear to be GTCC and PFBC (imported hard coal fired)
technologies. PFBC plants seem to enjoy a fairly clear advantage in Germany and Italy while GTCC
an even more marked advantage in Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland and the United Kingdom. These
differences are almost exclusively due to variation in the price of natural gas to power generators in
the various countries. Even at these high utilisation rates the PWR nuclear generating technology
option is uncompetitive in almost all EU countries due to very high capital costs. The only exception is
France where streamlining of licensing and construction procedures, the existence of an adequate
infrastructure and learning by doing experience has meant that construction times and hence costs are
significantly lower than elsewhere in the EU. However even in France PWRs remain a reasonably
competitive option only for such very high loads. Wind Power is an unambiguously attractive option
in Denmark due to lower costs and an adequate policy support but fall significantly short of the most
economic option in all other EU countries.
Removing excise taxes and subsidies does not significantly alter the ranking of options. It works
primarily in favour of GTCC, natural gas being taxed heavily in some countries (Denmark and to a
lesser extent Italy and Germany). In Denmark GTCC becomes by far the most attractive option while
in Italy GTCC generating costs approach PFBC sufficiently to suggest that away from specially
designed coal handling port facilities GTCC would be preferable even for such high utilisation rates.
As for the effect of the removal of German domestic coal subsidies although it obviously makes the
option more expensive they were not sufficient to make German coal attractive for new users in the
first place. As can be seen in the table, excise taxes
1 lead to market distortion, in terms of technology
choice, only in the cases of Denmark and Germany (in both cases operating in favour of coal and to
the detriment of natural gas). This result is largely explained by the fact that in most EU Member
States the excise taxes applied on fuels used in power generation are rather small (zero in many cases)
with the exception of fuel oil, which, however, is not a competitive solution.
1 In the case of Germany there is a subsidy on domestic coal prices11
Table 1: Production cost of power generation technologies at 7000 hours
PFBC
(imported
coal)
PFBC
(domestic
coal)
Monovalent
Lignite
Monovalent
Fuel oil
GTCC
Monovalent
biomass-
waste
Wind
turbines*
Solar
photovoltaic*
Nuclear
Austria 0.036 na 0.040 0.054 0.034 0.036 0.048 0.483 0.059
Belgium 0.032 na na 0.050 0.028 0.037 0.048 0.483 0.040
Denmark 0.037 na na 0.098 0.041 0.039 0.034 0.644 0.059
Finland 0.032 na 0.036 0.056 0.026 0.039 0.048 0.644 0.038
France 0.032 0.041 0.039 0.056 0.032 0.040 0.040 0.386 0.034
Germany 0.032 0.038 0.040 0.055 0.038 0.043 0.045 0.483 0.051
Greece 0.035 na 0.040 0.056 0.035 0.040 0.048 0.386 0.046
Ireland 0.032 na 0.037 0.050 0.032 0.045 0.048 0.644 0.047
Italy 0.032 na na 0.049 0.038 0.040 0.048 0.386 0.050
The Netherlands 0.036 na na 0.054 0.027 0.040 0.044 0.483 0.051
Portugal 0.032 na na 0.049 0.034 0.043 0.048 0.386 0.059
Spain 0.036 0.050 0.038 0.053 0.035 0.043 0.047 0.386 0.047
Sweden 0.036 na 0.039 0.087 0.033 0.034 0.048 0.644 0.047
United Kingdom 0.032 0.045 na 0.055 0.026 0.038 0.044 0.483 0.043
PFBC
(imported
coal)
PFBC
(domestic
coal)
Monovalent
Lignite
Monovalent
Fuel oil
GTCC
Monovalent
biomass-
waste
Wind
turbines*
Solar
photovoltaic*
Nuclear
Austria 0.036 na 0.040 0.049 0.034 0.036 0.072 0.640 0.059
Belgium 0.032 na na 0.049 0.028 0.037 0.072 0.640 0.040
Denmark 0.036 na na 0.049 0.029 0.039 0.067 0.853 0.059
Finland 0.032 na 0.036 0.049 0.026 0.039 0.072 0.853 0.038
France 0.032 0.041 0.039 0.049 0.032 0.040 0.072 0.512 0.034
Germany 0.032 0.041 0.040 0.049 0.035 0.043 0.068 0.640 0.051
Greece 0.035 na 0.040 0.048 0.035 0.040 0.072 0.512 0.046
Ireland 0.032 na 0.037 0.049 0.032 0.045 0.072 0.853 0.047
Italy 0.032 na na 0.049 0.034 0.040 0.072 0.512 0.050
The Netherlands 0.036 na na 0.050 0.026 0.040 0.072 0.640 0.051
Portugal 0.032 na na 0.049 0.034 0.043 0.072 0.512 0.059
Spain 0.036 0.050 0.038 0.051 0.035 0.043 0.071 0.512 0.047
Sweden 0.036 na 0.039 0.052 0.033 0.034 0.072 0.853 0.047
United Kingdom 0.032 0.045 na 0.049 0.026 0.038 0.072 0.640 0.043
Production cost (Euro'90/KWh) for power plant operating at 7000 hours
with excise taxes/subsidies
without excise taxes/subsidies
*For intermittent generating options the 7000 hours refer to availability of equipment and not overall availability which is clearly much lower and
has been taken into account in the calculations
When examining the cost effectiveness of alternative solutions in power generation for plants
operating at 5000 hours (see Table 2) it is clear that the low capital costs of GTCC renders this option
even more attractive. The only countries where PFBCs retain a clear advantage are Germany and Italy
mainly due to the excise taxes applied in these countries. Obviously this advantage is virtually
neutralised in the case of removal of excise taxes and subsidies. All other plant types in the list
considered are clearly unattractive irrespective of the presence or not of excise taxes and subsidies.
The above result is explained by the fact that at lower operating levels the role of fuel price in total
operating cost becomes less significant.
At 2500 hours the findings presented above are accentuated GTCC becoming by far the dominant
option everywhere. The presence of excise taxes or subsidies does not result in any market distortion
as regards producer choices (see Table 3).12
Table 2: Production cost of power generation technologies at 5000 hours
PFBC
(imported
coal)
PFBC
(domestic
coal)
Monovalent
Lignite
Monovalent
Fuel oil
GTCC
Monovalent
biomass-
waste
Nuclear
Austria 0.043 na 0.050 0.061 0.039 0.045 0.080
Belgium 0.039 na na 0.056 0.032 0.046 0.053
Denmark 0.045 na na 0.104 0.045 0.048 0.080
Finland 0.039 na 0.045 0.062 0.030 0.048 0.050
France 0.039 0.049 0.048 0.063 0.036 0.049 0.045
Germany 0.039 0.046 0.050 0.061 0.043 0.052 0.068
Greece 0.042 na 0.049 0.062 0.039 0.049 0.062
Ireland 0.039 na 0.046 0.057 0.036 0.054 0.063
Italy 0.039 na na 0.055 0.043 0.049 0.067
The Netherlands 0.043 na na 0.061 0.031 0.049 0.069
Portugal 0.039 na na 0.055 0.039 0.052 0.080
Spain 0.043 0.059 0.048 0.060 0.039 0.052 0.063
Sweden 0.043 na 0.048 0.094 0.038 0.041 0.063
United Kingdom 0.040 0.053 na 0.062 0.030 0.048 0.057
PFBC
(imported
coal)
PFBC
(domestic
coal)
Monovalent
Lignite
Monovalent
Fuel oil
GTCC
Monovalent
biomass-
waste
Nuclear
Austria 0.043 na 0.050 0.055 0.039 0.045 0.080
Belgium 0.039 na na 0.055 0.032 0.046 0.053
Denmark 0.043 na na 0.055 0.034 0.048 0.080
Finland 0.039 na 0.045 0.055 0.030 0.048 0.050
France 0.039 0.049 0.048 0.055 0.036 0.049 0.045
Germany 0.039 0.049 0.050 0.055 0.039 0.052 0.068
Greece 0.042 na 0.049 0.055 0.039 0.049 0.062
Ireland 0.039 na 0.046 0.055 0.036 0.054 0.063
Italy 0.039 na na 0.055 0.039 0.049 0.067
The Netherlands 0.043 na na 0.056 0.030 0.049 0.069
Portugal 0.039 na na 0.055 0.039 0.052 0.080
Spain 0.043 0.059 0.048 0.058 0.039 0.052 0.063
Sweden 0.043 na 0.048 0.058 0.038 0.041 0.063
United Kingdom 0.040 0.053 na 0.055 0.030 0.048 0.057
Production cost (Euro'90/KWh) for power plant operating at 5000 hours
with excise taxes/subsidies
without excise taxes/subsidies
The overall taxation burden on fuels for power generation is relatively low as there is a general
reluctance to tax what is effectively an input to production. The only notable exception to this in most
countries is the taxation on heavy fuel oil introduced in the past in response to the oil crises of the
seventies and early eighties in order to accelerate substitution away from an insecure fuel form in a
sector that was characterised by the presence of many alternatives. This process of substitution is now
virtually completed and the disadvantages of fuel oil burning equipment compared with new types of
plant presently available is such as to make it a highly unattractive choice for new equipment even
without the taxes on the fuel. In this sense the tax is currently irrelevant with regard to fuel choices
(and becoming increasingly so even as a revenue raising devise).
In general the dominance in terms of competitiveness of the GTCC option for widely varying
utilisation rates is very marked in virtually all EU countries. This dominance is accentuated when
taxes and subsidies are removed. Subsidies and supports on renewable forms of power and notably
wind power play a significant role in enhancing their attractiveness. However with very few
exceptions the costs of these technologies is still high and the level of support is not sufficient to make
them into credible alternatives for wide use.
Consequently the present levels of excise taxes and subsidies in power generation do not seem to have
a significant impact on the competitiveness of fuels and technologies in the sector.13
Table 3: Production cost of power generation technologies at 2500 hours
PFBC
(imported
coal)
PFBC
(domestic
coal)
Monovalent
Lignite
Monovalent
Fuel oil
GTCC
Monovalent
biomass-
waste
Nuclear
Austria 0.070 na 0.082 0.083 0.054 0.078 0.153
Belgium 0.065 na na 0.079 0.047 0.078 0.098
Denmark 0.071 na na 0.127 0.061 0.080 0.153
Finland 0.065 na 0.078 0.085 0.046 0.081 0.093
France 0.065 0.079 0.080 0.085 0.052 0.081 0.084
Germany 0.065 0.076 0.082 0.084 0.059 0.084 0.129
Greece 0.067 na 0.080 0.084 0.054 0.080 0.116
Ireland 0.065 na 0.078 0.079 0.049 0.086 0.119
Italy 0.065 na na 0.078 0.059 0.082 0.127
The Netherlands 0.070 na na 0.083 0.047 0.081 0.130
Portugal 0.065 na na 0.078 0.054 0.084 0.153
Spain 0.070 0.088 0.080 0.082 0.055 0.084 0.120
Sweden 0.070 na 0.080 0.116 0.054 0.068 0.118
United Kingdom 0.066 0.083 na 0.084 0.046 0.080 0.107
PFBC
(imported
coal)
PFBC
(domestic
coal)
Monovalent
Lignite
Monovalent
Fuel oil
GTCC
Monovalent
biomass-
waste
Nuclear
Austria 0.070 na 0.082 0.078 0.054 0.078 0.153
Belgium 0.065 na na 0.078 0.047 0.078 0.098
Denmark 0.070 na na 0.078 0.050 0.080 0.153
Finland 0.065 na 0.078 0.078 0.046 0.081 0.093
France 0.065 0.079 0.080 0.078 0.052 0.081 0.084
Germany 0.065 0.079 0.082 0.078 0.055 0.084 0.129
Greece 0.067 na 0.080 0.077 0.054 0.080 0.116
Ireland 0.065 na 0.078 0.078 0.049 0.086 0.119
Italy 0.065 na na 0.078 0.055 0.082 0.127
The Netherlands 0.070 na na 0.078 0.046 0.081 0.130
Portugal 0.065 na na 0.078 0.054 0.084 0.153
Spain 0.070 0.088 0.080 0.080 0.055 0.084 0.120
Sweden 0.070 na 0.080 0.080 0.054 0.068 0.118
United Kingdom 0.066 0.083 na 0.078 0.046 0.080 0.107
Production cost (Euro'90/KWh) for power plant operating at 2500 hours
with excise taxes/subsidies
without excise taxes/subsidies
3. STEAM GENERATION FROM INDUSTRIAL BOILERS
Four different types of industrial boilers were examined in the analysis i.e. boilers using coal, fuel oil,
diesel oil and natural gas. In addition three characteristic Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plants: a
PFBC burning hard coal, a fuel oil plant and a GTCC plant were also considered. The GTCC CHP can
attain very high overall thermal efficiencies in electricity production and by injecting additional fuel
into the waste heat boiler it can produce high temperature steam which can be used for the usual
industrial steam applications. The method used for the computation of costs for CHP plants was to
calculate the total cost of producing the steam together with the power and then deduct the value of the
electricity produced. The benchmark used for the calculation of that value was the minimum cost per
kWh as it is presented in tables 1 to 3 above. In other words it is representative of the minimum price
at which the co-generation producer should reasonably expect to sell the power. Clearly if instead of
selling outside the industrial unit, it was assumed that the electricity was used to satisfy own demand
the avoided cost could be higher and the cost of the co-generated steam correspondingly lower.
Again, as in power generation, the operating cost of the alternative steam raising systems was
computed for 7000, 5000 and 2500 hours. These represent a very high, normal (two shifts) and very
low load for industrial steam. The results of the comparison of steam production costs with and
w i t h o u te x c i s et a x e sa r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e4 - T a b l e6b e l o w .14
Table 4: Production cost of steam generation from industrial boilers at 7000 hours
PFBC
(imported
coal)
Monovalent
Fuel oil
GTCC Coal Fuel oil Natural gas
Austria 0.008 0.031 0.006 0.018 0.024 0.017
Belgium 0.009 0.032 0.005 0.018 0.022 0.014
Denmark 0.009 0.085 0.014 0.019 0.047 0.022
Finland 0.011 0.041 0.003 0.022 0.026 0.014
France 0.005 0.036 0.005 0.024 0.026 0.016
Germany 0.005 0.034 0.014 0.037 0.023 0.019
Greece 0.006 0.032 0.005 0.020 0.026 0.019
Ireland 0.005 0.029 0.007 0.019 0.022 0.020
Italy 0.005 0.026 0.014 0.016 0.027 0.019
The Netherlands 0.015 0.038 0.004 0.018 0.025 0.015
Portugal 0.005 0.026 0.008 0.018 0.026 0.017
Spain 0.007 0.029 0.006 0.019 0.024 0.016
Sweden 0.009 0.072 0.005 0.018 0.041 0.017
United Kingdom 0.012 0.041 0.003 0.019 0.027 0.014
PFBC
(imported
coal)
Monovalent
Fuel oil
GTCC Coal Fuel oil Natural gas
Austria 0.008 0.024 0.006 0.018 0.021 0.017
Belgium 0.009 0.030 0.005 0.018 0.021 0.014
Denmark 0.013 0.029 0.004 0.015 0.021 0.015
Finland 0.011 0.032 0.003 0.015 0.021 0.012
France 0.005 0.026 0.005 0.024 0.022 0.016
Germany 0.005 0.026 0.009 0.037 0.021 0.017
Greece 0.006 0.023 0.005 0.019 0.023 0.018
Ireland 0.005 0.026 0.007 0.019 0.021 0.020
Italy 0.005 0.026 0.008 0.016 0.022 0.018
The Netherlands 0.016 0.033 0.003 0.018 0.022 0.014
Portugal 0.005 0.026 0.008 0.018 0.024 0.017
Spain 0.007 0.026 0.006 0.018 0.023 0.016
Sweden 0.009 0.028 0.005 0.018 0.023 0.017
United Kingdom 0.012 0.032 0.003 0.019 0.023 0.014
Boiler
CHP plant Boiler
Production cost (Euro'90/KWh) for CHP plant / boiler operating at 7000 hours
with excise taxes/subsidies
without excise taxes/subsidies
CHP plant15
Table 5: Production cost of steam generation from industrial boilers at 5000 hours
PFBC
(imported
coal)
Monovalent
Fuel oil
GTCC Coal Fuel oil Natural gas
Austria 0.012 0.034 0.006 0.021 0.026 0.017
Belgium 0.013 0.034 0.005 0.020 0.023 0.014
Denmark 0.007 0.081 0.008 0.021 0.048 0.022
Finland 0.015 0.044 0.004 0.024 0.028 0.014
France 0.008 0.038 0.005 0.027 0.027 0.017
Germany 0.006 0.034 0.011 0.039 0.024 0.020
Greece 0.010 0.035 0.006 0.023 0.027 0.020
Ireland 0.009 0.032 0.008 0.021 0.024 0.021
Italy 0.006 0.026 0.011 0.019 0.029 0.020
The Netherlands 0.019 0.041 0.004 0.020 0.026 0.016
Portugal 0.006 0.026 0.006 0.020 0.028 0.017
Spain 0.011 0.032 0.006 0.021 0.025 0.017
Sweden 0.013 0.075 0.006 0.020 0.043 0.017
United Kingdom 0.016 0.043 0.004 0.022 0.028 0.014
PFBC
(imported
coal)
Monovalent
Fuel oil
GTCC Coal Fuel oil Natural gas
Austria 0.012 0.026 0.006 0.021 0.023 0.017
Belgium 0.013 0.033 0.005 0.020 0.023 0.014
Denmark 0.016 0.031 0.005 0.018 0.023 0.015
Finland 0.015 0.035 0.004 0.018 0.023 0.012
France 0.009 0.029 0.005 0.027 0.023 0.017
Germany 0.006 0.026 0.006 0.039 0.023 0.017
Greece 0.010 0.026 0.006 0.022 0.024 0.019
Ireland 0.009 0.029 0.008 0.021 0.023 0.021
Italy 0.006 0.026 0.006 0.019 0.023 0.018
The Netherlands 0.020 0.036 0.004 0.020 0.023 0.015
Portugal 0.006 0.026 0.006 0.020 0.025 0.017
Spain 0.011 0.029 0.006 0.020 0.024 0.017
Sweden 0.013 0.031 0.006 0.020 0.024 0.017
United Kingdom 0.016 0.035 0.004 0.022 0.025 0.014
CHP plant Boiler
CHP plant Boiler
Production cost (Euro'90/KWh) for CHP plant / boiler operating at 5000 hours
with excise taxes/subsidies
without excise taxes/subsidies16
Table 6: Production cost of steam generation from industrial boilers at 2500 hours
PFBC
(imported
coal)
Monovalent
Fuel oil
GTCC Coal Fuel oil Natural gas
Austria 0.025 0.043 0.006 0.030 0.030 0.020
Belgium 0.027 0.044 0.007 0.029 0.028 0.017
Denmark 0.020 0.090 0.008 0.030 0.053 0.025
Finland 0.028 0.053 0.004 0.033 0.032 0.017
France 0.022 0.047 0.006 0.036 0.032 0.020
Germany 0.015 0.039 0.007 0.048 0.029 0.022
Greece 0.023 0.046 0.007 0.032 0.032 0.023
Ireland 0.025 0.043 0.011 0.031 0.028 0.024
Italy 0.015 0.031 0.007 0.028 0.034 0.023
The Netherlands 0.033 0.050 0.004 0.029 0.031 0.018
Portugal 0.020 0.036 0.006 0.029 0.032 0.020
Spain 0.024 0.041 0.007 0.030 0.030 0.020
Sweden 0.026 0.084 0.006 0.029 0.047 0.020
United Kingdom 0.029 0.052 0.004 0.031 0.033 0.017
PFBC
(imported
coal)
Monovalent
Fuel oil
GTCC Coal Fuel oil Natural gas
Austria 0.025 0.036 0.006 0.030 0.027 0.020
Belgium 0.027 0.043 0.007 0.029 0.027 0.017
Denmark 0.030 0.040 0.005 0.027 0.027 0.018
Finland 0.028 0.044 0.004 0.027 0.027 0.015
France 0.022 0.038 0.006 0.036 0.028 0.020
Germany 0.019 0.035 0.007 0.048 0.027 0.020
Greece 0.023 0.036 0.007 0.031 0.029 0.022
Ireland 0.025 0.041 0.011 0.031 0.027 0.024
Italy 0.019 0.035 0.006 0.028 0.028 0.021
The Netherlands 0.034 0.045 0.004 0.029 0.028 0.018
Portugal 0.020 0.036 0.006 0.029 0.030 0.020
Spain 0.024 0.038 0.007 0.029 0.029 0.020
Sweden 0.026 0.040 0.006 0.029 0.029 0.020
United Kingdom 0.029 0.044 0.004 0.031 0.029 0.017
Production cost (Euro'90/KWh) for CHP plant / boiler operating at 2500 hours
with excise taxes/subsidies
without excise taxes/subsidies
CHP plant Boiler
CHP plant Boiler
The most striking observation than can be made by looking at the above tables is that CHP, in one
form or another, appears to be cost effective compared to all steam-only boiler systems in all
countries, for all three utilisation rates and irrespective of whether excise duties are included or not.
This is clearly due to the very high overall efficiencies that characterise CHP systems and their very
competitive costs. This often overwhelming advantage does not however imply that CHP is currently
capable of sweeping the whole market for new steam raising equipment. A lot depends on whether an
adequate institutional and regulatory regime is in place for facilitating sales of excess electricity into
the grid. Furthermore CHP plants are characterised by considerable economies of scale which may
inhibit their application for small-scale steam requirements.
Among the CHP types examined the natural gas burning GTCC seems to be the most cost effective in
the majority of cases, its advantage increasing with the removal of excise taxes and with the decrease
of the utilisation rate. The latter occurs because of the considerably lower capital costs of GTCC CHP
compared to the PFBC alternative. For the higher utilisation rates the PFBC seems to enjoy a
substantial advantage in some countries (Denmark, Germany, Italy and Portugal) with high natural gas
prices often due to taxation. These advantages persist in some cases (Germany, Italy) when
considering the 5000-hour utilisation rate (although in this case they disappear when excise duties are
removed). Such advantages as appear to be enjoyed by coal fired CHP in some countries should17
however be qualified by the requirement that the plant should be located in areas with easy access to
coal importing port facilities and at a considerable distance from inhabited areas for air quality
reasons. Oil fired CHP is characterised by low conversion efficiencies and fails to compete
successfully with coal (let alone gas) even for the low utilisation rates and even in the absence of
excise duties.
As mentioned in the previous paragraph steam-only boilers suffer from considerable competitive
disadvantages compared with CHP but the latter may not represent a valid option in all cases. The
dominance of natural gas within the steam-only segment is if anything more complete than GTCC
within the CHP. Even for very high utilisation rates and in countries where gas prices to industrial
users are particularly high (Denmark, Italy, Ireland) the relative advantage of coal fired boilers is
slight and is virtually wiped out once excise duties are removed. Concerning the 2500 hours per year
utilisation rate heavy fuel oil boilers can be competitive in many countries vis-à-vis coal fired ones and
definitely become so in the absence of excise duties. This however does not occur anywhere vis-à-vis
the natural gas equivalents.
In general such excise duties and subsidies as exist in the industrial steam-raising sector seem to have
some effect in encouraging coal use in cases of very high utilisation rates. It seems that these duty
structures were designed to produce just this type of result in an effort to diversify supplies to industry
in order to enhance energy security. The emergence of low capital cost gas technologies and especially
GTCC CHP with very high overall thermal efficiencies has meant that most of the discrimination
mentioned above has been to a large extent neutralised. Consequently fiscal measures seem to
influence little the choices in this sector with the exception of some highly localised of its segments.
4. SPACE HEATING IN HOUSEHOLDS
In evaluating the effect of excise taxes on household choice regarding space heating equipment three
alternative technologies were examined, namely central heating equipment using gas oil, central
heating equipment using natural gas and electric heat pumps. One representative dwelling type was
considered (of a size of 90 square meters). Differences in weather conditions in different Member
States were also taken into account since the severity of weather conditions influences the utilisation
rate of installed equipment. Table 7 illustrates the results of the analysis.
Table 7: Annualised system costs cost for space heating in households
Gasoil Natural gas Electricity Gasoil Natural gas Electricity
Austria 614 533 1124 508 456 1041
Belgium 511 441 952 484 415 936
Denmark 875 821 1636 477 404 718
Finland 583 303 603 478 267 522
France 606 442 1092 489 437 1006
Germany 574 468 851 478 429 782
Greece 891 470 845 532 470 845
Ireland 525 478 708 459 478 708
Italy 1097 738 851 513 432 744
The Netherlands 558 460 806 467 353 611
Portugal 673 513 1219 574 513 1218
Spain 662 562 1035 550 553 1001
Sweden 824 448 911 495 448 719
United Kingdom 488 402 741 432 402 741
Production cost (Euro'90/toe-useful) for space heating
with excise taxes without excise taxes
Again natural gas central heating would seem to dominate choices of new systems to be installed in
EU households. This statement must be qualified by two very important considerations:
· The extent to which the gas distribution network has reached households varies enormously
from country to country. In Finland, Greece, Portugal and Sweden there has been such little
development of household access to natural gas as to render the choice practically inexistent. Spain18
and Denmark for different reasons have very small coverage. Even in mature residential gas markets
all localities are not served by the network and extensions in some cases are unlikely in view of high
costs and inadequate projected demand to justify them.
· As mentioned in the introduction the year 2000 has not been a very typical year in the sense that
petroleum product prices like gas oil have increased very substantially while natural gas prices have
followed suit very partially. Such differentials may not be sustainable even in the very near future.
Excise taxes appear to affect little the choices as far as the main competing systems (natural gas and
gas oil fired) are concerned. The only clear reversals occur in Spain and Ireland where as mentioned
earlier the residential gas distribution network is not sufficiently developed to make gas an option for
the majority of cases anyway. The main reason for this relative insensitivity is that to a large extent
taxation of fuels for household users seems to be non-discriminatory. This is especially the case in
countries with very high taxation levels (Denmark and Italy) where excise taxes fall equally hard on
the two main fuels.
This apparent stability of choices in the face of excise duties could be substantially eroded in a
situation of low petroleum product prices (as was the case in the very recent past) with natural gas
prices only slightly lower than the ones used in this study. In this case taxation designed to discourage
the use of oil could be argued to be doing just that.
The electric heat pump alternative under the assumptions used in this study seems to be excluded on
competitiveness grounds irrespective of excise taxation. However in the case of Finland and Sweden,
given that the residential gas network is not developed, it could come within the valid option range on
condition that taxes on gas oil are maintained (at punitive rates in the case of Sweden).
5. PRIVATE CARS
In the transport sector the analysis was restricted to the crucial sector of private cars which is currently
overwhelmingly dominated by petroleum products (gasoline, diesel, LPG) and has attracted
considerable policy attention both in terms of energy security (it being a major cause of growth in
petroleum imports) but also in view of the very high externalities (congestion and environmental
pollution) associated with it.
One representative “average” car in terms of size and accessories was considered. Countries were not
differentiated in terms of average distance travelled, although such differences clearly exist, in order to
maintain a measure of comparability across countries. However, issues regarding differences in terms
of unit consumption across the different Member States were taken into account since they reflect a
number of key factors such as driving conditions (urban versus non-urban travel, congestion on the
r o a d se t c )a sw e l la sc o n s u m e rp r e f e r e n c e si nt e r m so fv e h i c l ep o w e r .
The taxation analysis was not limited to fuel taxes but was extended to include car acquisition taxes
(registration taxes) as well as annual road taxes. Registration taxes are very important in determining
the total cost of running vehicles because they are applied on vehicle costs, themselves representing a
high percentage of life cycle costs. They vary considerably from country to country despite pressures
in the context of EU harmonisation during the nineties. Denmark, Finland, Greece and Portugal apply
very high registration taxes in one form or another, a fact which goes some way in explaining why car
ownership in most of these countries falls short of what could be expected from per capita income
compared with other EU Member States. On the other end of the spectrum Belgium, Germany, France,
Italy and the U.K. do not apply any registration taxes other than VAT (not considered in the tax
removal sensitivity analysis in this study which is specifically concerned with excise taxes). Road
taxes can also be an important cost element in running a vehicle. This is particularly so in the
Netherlands and Ireland but also in the U.K., Denmark and Germany whereas they are very low in
Italy and Portugal. Special taxes also apply in some countries on motor insurance and many states
impose tolls for the use of some highways and other transportation infrastructure (bridges, tunnels etc).
The present analysis does not include such cost elements as their attribution to the costs of running19
private vehicles was found to pose some difficulties and in addition they did not appear to be as
significant as registration and road taxes.
Four engine types have been considered for the purpose of the analysis: standard gasoline, diesel,
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) available in limited distribution in most countries and methanol with
virtually non-existent distribution network at present. The inclusion of the latter is justified by the fact
that it represents the non-oil technology that is closest to market implementation at present. It was
assumed that the methanol was derived from natural gas at an efficiency of 70% and that it was taxed
at the same rate as gasoline in order to maintain fiscal neutrality. Diesel cars although more efficient
than gasoline driven ones are heavier and more expensive than their gasoline alternatives. Likewise
LPG and methanol driven vehicles are more costly to build than standard gasoline driven ones.
Two alternative cases as regards the annual mileage of cars were examined: 18000 km which is
approximately the EU average for gasoline cars and 13000 km representing approximately the EU
average for gasoline cars.
The tables below present the cost comparisons between the different types of cars for the two
utilisation rates, with and without excise taxes.
Table 8: Unit cost per km driven for average annual mileage of a gasoline car
Diesel Gasoline LPG Methanol
Austria 0.570 0.547 0.602 0.581
Belgium 0.626 0.618 0.635 0.649
Denmark 0.976 0.918 1.044 0.970
Finland 0.778 0.739 0.805 0.785
France 0.495 0.487 0.511 0.522
Germany 0.629 0.619 0.653 0.654
Greece 0.730 0.688 0.770 0.723
Ireland 0.884 0.841 0.915 0.874
Italy 0.426 0.409 0.447 0.439
The Netherlands 0.929 0.911 0.945 0.950
Portugal 0.592 0.553 0.634 0.588
Spain 0.490 0.470 0.547 0.496
Sweden 0.581 0.568 0.597 0.608
United Kingdom 0.726 0.702 0.726 0.743
Diesel Gasoline LPG Methanol
Austria 0.345 0.317 0.373 0.330
Belgium 0.344 0.314 0.370 0.328
Denmark 0.343 0.313 0.375 0.327
Finland 0.344 0.311 0.367 0.326
France 0.341 0.309 0.372 0.324
Germany 0.341 0.309 0.369 0.324
Greece 0.341 0.315 0.374 0.328
Ireland 0.341 0.308 0.364 0.323
Italy 0.340 0.309 0.368 0.324
The Netherlands 0.344 0.316 0.363 0.330
Portugal 0.339 0.312 0.372 0.327
Spain 0.341 0.310 0.372 0.324
Sweden 0.350 0.322 0.374 0.335
United Kingdom 0.345 0.312 0.381 0.326
without excise tax
Transport cost (Euro'90/km driven) for private cars (annual mileage
13000 km per year)
with excise tax20
Table 9: Unit cost per km driven for average annual mileage of a diesel car
Diesel Gasoline LPG Methanol
Austria 0.423 0.413 0.444 0.441
Belgium 0.463 0.464 0.464 0.491
Denmark 0.716 0.680 0.765 0.722
Finland 0.572 0.552 0.585 0.589
France 0.368 0.370 0.376 0.400
Germany 0.465 0.466 0.481 0.496
Greece 0.536 0.511 0.563 0.538
Ireland 0.647 0.619 0.666 0.645
Italy 0.318 0.311 0.331 0.336
The Netherlands 0.682 0.677 0.687 0.710
Portugal 0.435 0.413 0.465 0.440
Spain 0.363 0.353 0.412 0.375
Sweden 0.434 0.434 0.439 0.468
United Kingdom 0.543 0.530 0.535 0.566
Diesel Gasoline LPG Methanol
Austria 0.255 0.237 0.275 0.246
Belgium 0.253 0.234 0.272 0.243
Denmark 0.253 0.233 0.276 0.243
Finland 0.253 0.232 0.269 0.241
France 0.250 0.230 0.274 0.240
Germany 0.251 0.229 0.270 0.239
Greece 0.251 0.235 0.276 0.244
Ireland 0.251 0.228 0.266 0.238
Italy 0.250 0.230 0.270 0.239
The Netherlands 0.254 0.236 0.265 0.245
Portugal 0.249 0.233 0.274 0.242
Spain 0.251 0.230 0.273 0.240
Sweden 0.259 0.242 0.276 0.250
United Kingdom 0.255 0.232 0.283 0.242
Transport cost (Euro'90/km driven) for private cars (annual mileage
18000 km per year)
without excise taxes
with excise taxes
The most striking feature coming out from the figures is the extent to which taxation affects the
overall cost of running private cars. In most cases it results in an approximate doubling while in some
countries (notably Denmark, the Netherlands and Ireland) with automotive taxation regimes designed
to actively discourage private vehicles the cost approximately trebles. It is clear that fiscal measures
seriously disadvantage car ownership and use and in their absence one could suspect that their
remarkable growth could become inexorable.
In comparison to this general observation the impact of excise taxes on the choice of vehicle types
seems relative minor. The wide differentials between excise taxes for gasoline and diesel designed to
discriminate in favour of commercial road transport, which characterised some countries in the past,
have been narrowing considerably in recent years. Furthermore particularly high ex-refinery gas oil
prices during the second half of 2000 have meant additional narrowing of differentials even in
traditionally “dieselisation” countries like France, Spain, Italy and Belgium. Consequently, given the
higher car purchase prices, diesel is only marginally more attractive than gasoline in only a few
countries (France, Germany and Belgium) even at the 18000 km/year utilisation rate. This picture
would be altered if higher than average mileages were considered but such an extension would go
somewhat beyond the scope of the present study. At any rate such small advantages as are enjoyed by
diesel in some countries disappear when excise taxes are removed the higher acquisition cost clearly
outweighing the gains in fuel efficiency.21
LPG seems to be reasonably competitive in some countries like Belgium, Sweden and to a lesser
extent France for the higher utilisation rate. These small advantages however arise from discriminating
taxation and disappear in the absence of all excise taxes, swamped by the higher vehicle acquisition
costs.
The methanol car which as was mentioned earlier is still somewhat a theoretical possibility is
handicapped by the higher vehicle costs but does become competitive at least vis-à-vis diesel powered
vehicles if all excise taxes are removed. This eventuality is however highly unlikely in view of the
importance of transportation fuel taxation for revenue collection purposes. Clearly the analysis
suggests that for a large-scale introduction of methanol as an alternative transportation fuel some fiscal
discrimination in its favour may be necessary. The scale of the required discrimination could however
be relatively modest.22
ANNEX 3
COAL AFTER THE EUROPEAN COAL ANDSTEEL COMMUNITY (ECSC) TREATY
EXPIRES
The world coal market is a stable market, with abundant resources and a wide geopolitical
diversity of supply. Even in the long term, with growing world demand, the risk of any
prolonged disruption of supply, even if it cannot be ruled out altogether, is minimal. Coal is
imported into the European Community primarily from its partners within the International
Energy Agency (IEA) or from countries with which the Community or the Member States
have signed trade agreements. These partners represent guaranteed suppliers.
At Community level, coal is regulated by the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC Treaty), which was signed in Paris on 18 April 1951. Several regulations
have been adopted on the basis of this Treaty, including Council Decision No 3632/93/ECSC
of 28 December 1993 establishing Community rules for state aid to the coal industry.
(1)
The ECSC Treaty, along with the rules adopted in application thereof, expires on
23 July 2002. We need to look, therefore, at a future Community system that will have to
incorporate a component which has become very significant in recent decades, namely, state
aid. Expiry of the ECSC Treaty should also provide the opportunity for a wide-ranging review
of the place of coal among the Community's other sources of primary energy.
1. 1950 – 2000 : the main objectives of coal in the Community
Coal held a prime position in the supply of Europe's energy, a position enshrined in the
ECSC Treaty. Indeed, the Treaty lays down that the institutions of the Community must
"ensure an orderly supply to the common market, taking into account the needs of third
countries" (Article 3(a)) and "promote the growth of international trade and ensure that
equitable limits are observed in export pricing" (Article 3(f)).
In the first years of application of the Treaty, coal's contribution to energy supplies was
provided exclusively by a flourishing Community industry in the process of modernisation. A
few years later, however, saw the addition of coal imports from third countries. These imports
gradually began to compete with Community coal.
The oil crises of the 1970s, which came at a time when the Club of Rome was considering
limits to growth, put the issue of security of energy supply back on the agenda. In the light of
these crises the Member States placed the emphasis on substitution policies designed to
reduce their dependence on oil. Thus, the use of coal was one of the policies that helped to
counter the oil shocks. Ambitious RTD and demonstration programmes were also set up at
Community level, and national strategies to counter oil dependence focused, among other
things, on encouraging coal production in the Community and coal imports from third
countries.
These strategies had very different results.
(1) OJ L 329, 30.12.1993, p 12.23
In the face of an increasingly dynamic international market, the Community coal industry was
forced, at the beginning of the 1980s, to begin root and branch restructuring, all the more so
because of decisions to expand taken some years earlier. In terms of supply, imported coal
gradually took over from Community coal, although without any increase in the risk of
disruption of supply or price instability for coal.
While security of supply was the watchword of the 1970s, the 1990s saw the emergence of
environmental concerns. It is becoming increasingly obvious that coal could only play a part
in energy supply if it managed to control its impact on the environment. Technology will help
to take up this environmental challenge, which stems principally from climate change and
acidification.
Thus, while the idea underlying the signing of the ECSC Treaty was to create a common
market in coal, decisions concerning this source of energy, for the last 25 years at least, have
been driven far more by energy policy, especially security of supply, and environmental
concerns.
2. Economic appraisal of the Community coal sector
2.1. Coal market
EUR 15
(in million
tonnes)
1975 1985 1990 1995 1998 1999 2000
(*)
Community
production
268 217.4 197 136 108 100 85
Consumption 327 343 329 280 263 253 243
Imports 59 114 132 137 145 150 154
(*) Estimates
The European Community also produces 235 million tonnes of lignite (the equivalent of
70 million tce
(2)).
2.2. Global assessment
In 1999, coal production in the European Union amounted to around 100 million tonnes, split
as follows: France = 4 millions tonnes; Germany = 41 millions tonnes;
United Kingdom = 36 millions tonnes; and Spain = 16 million tonnes.
Despite the process started in 1965 to restructure, modernise and streamline the coal industry,
which was accompanied by massive aid granted by the Member States, most of the coal
produced in the Community cannot compete with imports from third countries. The various
aid mechanisms put in place, the current arrangements being governed by Decision
No 3632/93/ECSC pursuant to Article 95 of the ECSC Treaty, have not managed to produce
(2) tce= tonne coal equivalent.24
an economic solution to the structural crisis affecting the European coal industry. Indeed,
what progress has been made in terms of productivity has not been enough to cope with the
prices prevailing on the international markets.
With the exception of a certain amount of potential in the United Kingdom, the objective of a
competitive Community coal industry on international markets is completely out of the
question despite the efforts made by production companies, both technologically and
organisationally, to improve productivity. This is explained primarily by increasingly
unfavourable geological conditions through the gradual exhaustion of the most readily
accessible deposits and the relatively low level of the price of coal on international markets.
2.3. Assessment and prospects by producer country
· France
Under the National Coal Pact agreed between the two sides of industry in 1995 coal
extraction is gradually being phased out and will stop completely in 2005. All mines therefore
form part of a closure plan and receive aid to reduce activities for the exclusive coverage of
operating losses.
Because of the severity of social and regional problems, the French Government has not been
able to keep to the 2002 deadline provided for by Decision No 3632/93/ECSC. Given the
extremely difficult operating conditions, however, coal-mining could well stop before the end
of 2005. There has been a constant increase in production costs which in 2000 should reach
EUR 170/tonne (compared with the price of imported coal of EUR 35 - 40/tonne).
· Spain
Spain has adopted a restructuring plan for the period 1998-2002 which provides for an annual
decrease in production, which should be no more than 12.7 million tonnes in 2002. Even
though this plan provides for a gradual reduction in aid to current production of the order of
4% per year, coal-mining in Spain has very little prospect of being competitive. Production
costs are currently at a level of EUR 130-140/tonnes.
In recent years the Spanish Government has granted annual aid of the order of EUR 1 billion,
a significant proportion of which (70%) is in the form of aid to current production. While
several mines are already covered by a closure plan, and thus receive aid to reduce activity, a
large proportion of production still receives operating aid. This category of aid is set aside in
principle for production units that can improve their economic viability by reducing
production costs.
· Germany
The restructuring plan adopted by Germany in 1997 provides for a reduction in coal
production to 26 million tonnes in 2005. Coal-mining in Germany has no prospect of
competing with imported coal in the long term. Production costs, due to increasingly difficult
geological conditions, have decreased very little since 1994 and are currently running at
EUR 130-140/tonne.
In 1999 the German Government granted aid totalling EUR 4.6 billion, of which more than
4 billion were to current production. Under the 1997 restructuring plan the global aid package
should be gradually reduced to EUR 2.8 billion in 2005.25
· United Kingdom
As a result of concentrating activities in the most productive mines and sustained efforts to
improve viability, the United Kingdom is the only Community country where the coal
industry has received no State aid since 1995. That said, a number of factors, including the
sudden fall in prices on the international markets in 1999, have compelled the British
authorities to consider granting aid, albeit on a very modest scale, of around UKL 110 million
over the period 2000-2002.
The aim of the assistance plan in the United Kingdom is to provide temporary support - until
the expiry of the ECSC Treaty- to production units that are economically and financially
viable in the long term but which are experiencing certain temporary problems that could
result in their closure.
3. What future for Community coal?
When the ECSC Treaty expires, in the absence of any financial support measures, the large
majority of the European coal industry would be condemned to disappear in the very short
term. Such an evolution would only increase the uncertainties which are likely to remain
regarding the long term energy supply of the European Union.
The orientations for a future support regime for Community coal when the ECSC Treaty
expires could incorporate the two fundamental objectives which have emerged since the
Treaty was signed, mentioned at point (1) above. Coal could thus play a part in the security
of energy supply in the European Community while taking account of the environmental
dimension.
If the intention is to guarantee the long term availability of some European coal production
capacity in order to cover possible risks which could affect the energy market, a future for
Community coal can only be envisaged if it is accompanied by a mechanism of intervention
by public authorities.
Such a regime would make it possible to guarantee the maintenance of access to reserves. For
that purpose, a minimum quantity of subsidised coal should be produced, not for production
as such, but to keep the equipment in an operating condition and to retain the professional
qualifications of a nucleus of miners and technological expertise. This base would thus
contribute to strengthening the security of supply of the long-term Community.
It would include coal, but also possibly other energy resources such as renewable energy. In
addition to the aim of security of supply, this renewable energy would contribute directly to
the promotion of environmental objectives, in particular under the Kyoto protocol.
4. Enlargement of the European Union
Any reflection on the future framework for Community coal should also consider the situation
in the countries that have applied for accession to the European Union. This issue is
particularly relevant for the two principal producers of coal in central and Eastern Europe,
namely, Poland and the Czech Republic, especially as Poland alone currently accounts for
production levels equivalent to the four producer countries in the Community.
In 1999 Poland produced 112 million tonnes of coal, as against 14 million tonnes in the Czech
Republic. Other central and eastern European countries also produce coal, albeit in practically26
negligible quantities. These are Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, which each produce 2 to
3 million tonnes of coal per year. In addition to coal they also produce 186 million tonnes of
lignite (equivalent of 55 million tce).
Following an initial phase of restructuring in 1993, accompanied by a significant wave of
privatisation, the Czech Republic is currently in the process of a second restructuring phase of
its coal industry.
Poland adopted a restructuring plan for the period 1998-2002, providing for a lowering of
production to 100 million tonnes in 2002 (as against 148 million tonnes in 1990) and a
reduction in jobs to 128 000 miners (as against 391 100 in 1990). In the middle of the 1980s
Poland was the fourth biggest exporter of coal to the European Union. After losing market
share at the end of the 1980s/beginning of the 1990s, coal exports have gradually increased to
around 12% (approximately 20 million tonnes) of coal imports into the European Union.
Production costs, especially wages, have gradually exerted more and more pressure on
coal-mining companies. The current restructuring plan, which provides for a significant
lowering of production, ought to allow the situation to stabilise. Efforts should nonetheless be
kept up beyond 2002, with further reductions in national production targeting mines with the
largest deficits.
The Polish coal industry is in a very similar position to the German coal industry, the
geological conditions often being very similar. A significant proportion of Polish coal can
thus no longer compete with coal from non-European countries (China, United States and
South Africa). The Polish coal industry will thus depend increasingly on aid granted by the
public authorities.
5. Conclusion
By giving room for manoeuvre to Member States that have committed themselves to a
process of restructuring their coal industry, financing based on a system of primary energy
would also make it possible to promote renewable energy which will help to reinforce
environmental policies.
As for the share reserved for Community coal, the establishment of such a regime to succeed
the ECSC should in no way divert Member States from the obligation to streamline this
sector. Restructuring measures embarked upon within the ECSC Treaty have to be continued.
While security of supply is clearly a priority, this priority can in no way provide an excuse for
keeping coal production at levels that defy economic logic.